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Scholars are playing an ever widening role in shaping the law as
courts increasingly look to them for guidance.' Faced with swollen
dockets, and the novel and perplexing problems that unceasingly boil
up in our troubled era, courts must perforce rely on those who alone
find time to explore these problems in depth. To the ordinary burdens
of scholarship, therefore, is added the heightened responsibility which
judicial reliance must engender. Man, however, is fallible, and con-
sidering the encyclopaedic scope of some treatises, it is not surprising
that a text writer occasionally nods.2 Criticism performs the valuable
function of uncovering such oversights, analytical errors or questionable
conclusions.' And the receptiveness of a text writer to criticism serves
not only to strengthen and refine the details of his work but to assure
t A.B. University of Cincinnati, 1932; J.D. Northwestern University, 1935; LL.M.
Harvard University, 1938. Chairman, ABA Section-on Administrative Law, 1961-1962.
1 The growing tendency was already noted by Learned Hand in his article Have
the Bench and Bar Anything To Contribute to the Teaching of Law?, 24 MicH. L. Rv.
466, 480 (1924), and by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, Dedication of Myron Taylor Hall,
18 CORNE= L.Q. 1 (1932).
2"All human -survey is unavoidably incomplete,, and hence some relevant data
escape attention. As these become known to later observers, the existing description
has to be revised . . . ." DUNHAm, HEROES AN'D HaEREcs 325 (1964). Arguing
for adoption of the Constitution in 1788, James Iredell, later a Justice of the Supreme
Court, said, "There is nothing dishonorable in changing an opinion. Nothing is more
fallible than human judgment. No gentlemen will say that his is not fallible. Mine,
I am sure, has often proved so." 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES 14 (1881).
3 MULrM, USES OF THE PAST 32 (1953), emphasizes -the advantage derived from
the fact that "although every historian remains fallible and subject to bias, his work
remains subject to correction and criticism by his fellows, in professional journals
and congresses. The relative objectivity of contemporary social science, as Karl
Popper points out, is due not to the impartiality of all the social scientists, but to the
publicity and community of the scientific method."
(783)
784 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.114:7 83
the courts that their confidence is not misplaced. To adapt a remark
of Professor Arthur Sutherland, "a social scientist who permits" his
predilection for his own pronouncements "to minimize indications
tending toward unwelcome conclusions impairs the integrity of his
science." ' So too, he shakes confidence in the quality of his own
scholarship when he restates criticism unfairly and thus disables his
readers from judging its validity for themselves. A critic who cannot
accept a portion of his Treatise as Holy Writ is not therefore to be
excommunicated with bell, book and candle.'
These truisms are prompted by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis'
Comment' on my article "Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial
Review," " in which I was constrained to differ with his view that in
some areas arbitrary action must be and is unreviewable.8 His critique
gives rise to fresh differences which need to be brought into focus, par-
ticularly because the subject has not hitherto received the attention it
deserves. And his great influence as a widely cited authority makes it
important to notice grave deficiencies of scholarship exhibited by his
Comment, and to test it by standards on which he insisted in a blistering
attack on Dean Pound. His springboard will be mine:
The conclusions of such an illustrious legal scholar are nat-
urally welcomed by the American Bar as the product of
painstaking analysis and deep insight.'
His disservice to sound scholarship is so egregious and
his influence so powerful that I undertook to direct attention
to the many errors that permeated his address .... "
4 Sutherland, All Sides of the Question: Felix Frankfurter and Personal Freedom,
in MENDELSON, FELIX FRANKFURTER-THE JUDGE 109, 112 (1964).
5 Professor Jaffe has remarked that Professor Davis "throws his whole being
into the pursuit and correction of heresy wherever he meets it." Jaffe, English Ad-
ministrative Law-A Reply to Professor Davis, 1962 PuB. L. 407.
04 DAvis, ADMiNISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 28.16 (Supp. 1965) [hereinafter cited
as DAvis Supp. and referred to in text as Comment].
765 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Berger].
8 Professor Davis sent his manuscript to me, accompanied by a group of questions
and solicited my answers and criticism. I replied that a careful reading of my article
would disclose "the answer to your questions." And I added that he did not "present
a true picture of my argument. Nor do you meet the real issue-the validity of your
'practical interpretation' but seek rather to discredit the author [Berger] . .. ."
Back came a rejoinder: "I have read your article, I have reread it, and I have studied
it. I think what I am saying about it is accurate. But if you think it is not, I shall
much appreciate your telling me wherein I am mistaken."
To do so would have required a response of the dimensions of the article which
appears here. And in all candor, I consider that the public is entitled to have Professor
Davis' views in their pristine version, unfiltered by my criticism. The test of a
scholar is his own accuracy, not as corrected by a disputant. And no disputant in
a public debate owes his opponent a duty to correct his inaccuracies behind the scenes.9 Davis, Dean Pound and Administrative Law, 42 COLUm. L. REV. 89 (1942)
[hereinafter cited as Davis, Pound I].
10 Davis, Dean Pound's Errors About Administrative Agencies, 42 COLUm. L.
REv. 804 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Davis, Pound II]. More recently he stated
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The inimitable tone of the Davis Comment is exemplified by his
statement of "the question":
Of course, everyone, including every court, shares Mr.
Berger's opposition to administrative arbitrariness and abuse
of discretion. Everyone would like to have arbitrariness and
abuse corrected. In that overall attitude, everyone will agree
with Mr. Berger. If that were the question, there would be
nothing more to discuss. The question is whether courts
should step in whenever they find arbitrariness or abuse, or
whether some administrative action must be judicially unre-
viewable even to correct arbitrariness or abuse.'
1
That is by no means the question; courts are not left at large to muse
whether arbitrariness should be reviewable. The matter is governed
by statute: APA section 10(e) directs that courts "shall . . . set
aside agency action . . . found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion .... 1 2 And the question is, why should the
statutory mandate be curtailed. Professor Davis would bobtail the
mandate by an artificial interpretation of the second exception to
section 10,"3 and it is the validity of this interpretation that is at issue.
Grave constitutional doubts would be raised by the Davis pro-
posal selectively to shield arbitrary action from review. The due
process test of a statute, as summarized by Mr. Justice Brandeis,
is whether it is "unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious." 4  Arbitrary
application of a statute is as obnoxious to due process as is a statute
that is arbitrary in terms.3 What is denied to the legislative-principal
must be withheld from the administrative-agent. "[T]here is no place
in our constitutional system," said the Supreme Court, "for the exer-
cise of arbitrary power." "I
Professor Davis merely notices the point and dismisses it sum-
marily, saying: "No court has ever held that a federal statute cutting
off all judicial review of administrative arbitrariness or abuse of dis-
cretion is unconstitutional." '" If there is no square holding, there are
that "because of the great influence of the Wigmore treatise, a protest seems not
only fitting but essential:' Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness
and Convenience, in PERspEcrrvxs or LAW 69, 73 (Pound, Griswold & Sutherland
ed. 1964).
11 DAvis, SUpp. § 28.16, at 17.
1260 Stat 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §1009(e) (1964).
13 DAVIS, Sup'. § 28.16, at 25.
14 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 410 (1932) (dissenting
opinion). See also Berger 73 n.96.
35 Id. at 73 n.97. "The delegated power, of course, may not be exercised arbi-
trarily." FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 292 (1965).
16 Garfield v. United States ex rel. Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249, 262 (1908) ; see Berger
55, 57, 73-74, 88-89, 91.
17 DAvIs, Sunp. § 28.16, at 25. Perhaps the explanation may be that furnished
by Professor Davis himself: "The question whether Congress could withdraw juris-
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yet quite a few Supreme Court dicta that arbitrary action is un-
constitutional,"8 and Supreme Court dicta which reflect basic consti-
tutional principles are deserving of more respect'" than Professor
Davis accords them. Quite recently, First Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l
Bank, rejecting the view espoused by Professor Davis, declared that
[A]dministrative procedure . . . must conform to the re-
quirements of procedural due process of law which requires
at least . . . that the decision is not arbitrary, capricious
or illegal. . . . Any provision of the National Banking Act
that would deny procedural due process [which it is the
judicial function "to determine"] would raise a serious
constitutional question."0
The reader of my article may judge for himself whether my views are
sustained by the statutory exegesis and the legislative and constitutional
materials there set forth. That analysis is not met by a parade of
cases in which the court so well "understood what Mr. Berger mis-
understands-that under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act
some administrative discretion is reviewable and some is unreview-
able . . , 21. The few cases which rely on "the passage of the
Treatise . . . that Mr. Berger specifically rejects" 22 do not test
the Davis reading by analysis of the relevant statutory terms,
the legislative history or constitutional limitations-they accept it on
faith. On the other hand, my rejection was elaborately documented.
So "understanding" in Professors Davis' vocabulary must be equated
with uncritical acceptance of his interpretation, recalling the tailors in
diction of the federal courts to pass upon questions of constitutionality is a largely
academic one, for it has not arisen during the twentieth century, and if it did arise
the Supreme Court would probably use all available ingenuity to avoid the constitu-
tional issue." 4 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIV LAW TREATISE § 28.18, at 95 (1958) [herein-
after cited as DAvis, TREATISE]. Was not Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114
(1946), one such case? Of this army draft case, Professor Davis said that "con-
ceivably it would be unconstitutional to make administrative determinations final in
draft cases," but the "Supreme Court did not pass upon the constitutional question;
instead, it dealt with the problem as a matter of statutory interpretation"'-i.e., I
would conclude, in order to avoid the constitutional issue. 4 DAVIs, TPEATISE § 28.18,
at 94. Even so, Estep declared that "judicial review may indeed be required by the
Constitution . . . . And except when the Constitution requires it, judicial review of
administrative action may be granted or withheld as Congress chooses." 327 U.S.
at 120. (Emphasis added.)
18 See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text See also notes 76, 105 infra.
19 Cf. International Ry. v. Davidson, 65 F. Supp. 58, 59 (W.D.N.Y. 1945);
Riverside Cement Co. v. Rogan, 59 F. Supp. 401, 404 (S.D. Cal. 1945) ; United States
v. Roemig, 52 F. Supp. 857, 861 (N.D. Iowa 1943).
20 232 F. Supp. 725, 730-31 (E.D.N.C. 1964). Where state administrators arbi-
trarily denied a liquor license, Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1964),
required "adherence to the standards of due process; absolute and uncontrolled -dis-
cretion invites abuse." See also Berger 95 n.217.
21 DAvis, Su'p. § 28.16, at 22.
= Id. at 20.
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the fairy tale who pretended to clothe the naked king with costly
garments which only fools could not perceive.
I. PROFESSOR DAVIS' "LITERAL" MEANING
Section 10 of the APA provides in relevant part that: "Except
so far as . . . (2) agency action is by law committed to agency
discretion . . . [The reviewing court shall] (B) . . . set aside
agency action . . . found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . ." ' "Unlike
Mr. Berger," states Professor Davis, the courts "unanimously" read
the "except" clause "literally"; 24 they uniformly decide in "accord with
the literal words . . .". 2" Even the Supreme Court "reads that
clause literally, interpreting it according to the face value of its
words," 26 meaning apparently that if Congress "has left ['a matter']
to the discretion of the administrators," it is unreviewable. Only
Berger allegedly "rejects a literal interpretation of the provision of
§ 10 . . . The federal case law is uniformly against him." 27
Now these statements are utterly misleading as a moment's re-
flection will disclose and as I shall prove by the Professor's own
words. If the exception for review of "discretion" is given the "literal"
effect Professor Davis claims for it then, in every case where discretion
is conferred, review of any of the categories enumerated in section
10(e) is barred. Excess of jurisdiction, lack of substantial evidence,
nonobservance of procedure required by law, as well as arbitrariness
and abuse of discretion then become unreviewable. Such a construction
is palpably unreasonable and would render the statute unconstitutional,
as my article undertook to show. Despite the "except" clause the
courts continue to review all categories of section 10(e), including
arbitrary action and abuse of discretion, which phrases, parenthetically,
are used interchangeably 28
Indeed, after he wearies of belaboring me for rejecting a "literal"
reading, Professor Davis himself condemns such a construction:
The literal language says a court shall set aside an abuse
of discretion except so far as the agency may exercise dis-
cretion. But this makes neither grammatical nor practical
sense, for the exception consumes the whole power of the
2360 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964).
2 4 DAVIS, Suspp. § 28.16, at 25.
2
5Id. at 17.
2 6 1d. at 18. For an analysis of the cited Supreme Court case, see note 99 infra.
2 7 DAvis, Su'pp. § 28.16, at 25.
2 8 Berger 58-60.
788 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
reviewing court, and nothing in the legislative history sup-
ports an intent to deprive the courts of all power to correct
any abuse of discretion. 9
But how is this analysis to be reconciled with his flaying me for dis-
respect of the "literal" words, except on the adage "any stick to beat
a dog."
In fact, section 10 is not nearly as confused as would appear from
the Davis analysis. The "clash" between the exception for "dis-
cretion" and the direction to set aside "abuse of discretion" derives
from the mistaken assumption that because both employ the same
word, "discretion," they are mere variants of the same thing. To the
contrary, they are opposites: one posits the reasonable exercise of
power, the other, unreason and oppression; one is lawful, the other is
not30 There is no confusion: Congress wanted to safeguard one and
bar the other. First, it desired to prevent the substitution of judicial
judgment for the sound exercise of administrative discretion. The
House report states that "matters of discretion are necessarily ex-
empted from the section, since otherwise courts would in effect super-
sede agency functioning." 31 Second, Chairman Walter, thoroughly
alive to the "misunderstanding and confusion of terms respecting the
discretion of agencies," explained that "they do not have authority in
any case to act blindly or arbitrarily." 32 Congress accordingly did not
employ "discretion" to comprehend "abuse of discretion"; it did not
"authorize" arbitrary action "in any case"; and it treated the two
separately precisely because it was dealing with polar objectives. Thus
viewed, Congress aptly expressed its intent to insulate the exercise of
"discretion," i.e., reasonable action, and to make oppressive and un-
reasonable action reviewable. Indeed, this antithesis is underscored
by the very terms of section 10; "abuse of discretion" is by section
10(e) "not in accordance with law," whereas "discretion" is "by
29 DAvis, Supp. § 28.16, at 21. (Emphasis added.)
30 Berger 61. Though my article pointed out that Congress had these differences
in mind, I did not sufficiently emphasize that the Davis "literal" reading turned on
an assumption that Congress employed the statutory terms merely to represent different
aspects of the same thing, and I was for the moment, in fact, seduced by his use of
"literal." Berger 61-65.
31 S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 275 (1946) [hereinafter cited as S. Doc.
No. 248]. Compare the remark respecting declaratory orders under § 5(d): "The
-phrase 'sound discretion' means a reviewable discretion and will prevent agencies from
. . . arbitrarily withholding such orders . . . ." Id. at 25; cf. Jenkins v. Macy,
237 F. Supp. 60, 62 (E.D. Mo. 1964): "As long as the administrative agency . . .
had a sound basis for the decision made, and the decisions were not arbitrary, capri-
cious, or an abuse of discretion . ..the courts will not substitute their own decision
for the one already made."
32 S. Doc. No. 248, at 368 (Emphasis added.) ; Berger 62. For this Representa-
tive Walter had judicial precedent. Id. at 61 n.33.
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law committed" to the agency.33 Patently, Congress did not consider
that "abuse of discretion" was embraced within "discretion"; and by
the "exception" for "discretion" it left the "abuse" reviewable. In
the words of the House report, "In any case the existence of discretion
does not prevent a person from bringing a review action but merely
prevents him pro tanto from prevailing therein," ' i.e., if the exercise
of "discretion" was sound and not an "abuse."
It will profit us to dwell for a moment on some drafting alterna-
tives to which Congress might have turned. If, contrary to fact,
Congress regarded "discretion" and "abuse of discretion" as mere
variants rather than opposites, it could have provided in the second
exception from judicial review: "Except so far as . . 2) agency
action is by law committed to agency discretion, provided, however,
that abuse of discretion shall remain reviewable." Though clumsy,
such a proviso would plainly have accomplished the congressional
purposes. The separation of the "proviso" in space by placing it in
section 10(e) would not require a diametrically opposed result, nor
should replacement of such proviso by the present section 10(e) direc-
tion to set aside "abuse of discretion." Another alternative would have
been to omit the "except" clause altogether and to rely on the negative
implication of section 10(e), i.e., the direction to set aside "abuse of
discretion" negatives an intention to set aside "discretion": which is
not abused. Congress cannot be blamed for acting with an excess of
caution and spelling out the negative implication in the shape of the
second "except" clause though purists might regard it as surplusage.
But if we give "discretion" and "abuse of discretion" the plainly op-
posite meanings they had for Congress, the second exception and
section 10(e) make both "practical and grammatical sense," they
avoid the unreasonable consequences that flow from the Davis "literal"
reading, and they obviate the necessity of escape from that reading by
resort to his artificial interpretation of "committed by law." 35
When section 10 is so read, giving effect both to its terms and
its legislative history, I am absolved of the charge, repeatedly made by
Professor Davis, of reading the "except" clause right out of the ActY6
33 Id. at 61. See also p. 792 infra.
34 S. Doc. No. 248, at 275. (Emphasis added.)
-35 See pp. 790-91 infra.
36 DAvis, Supp. § 28.16, at 16-18. He states, for example, that Berger "realizes
that . . .writing the 'except' clause out of the Act does violence to the plain words."
Id. at 16. His "for instance" is my remark that "on a literal reading the exception
for 'discretion' at the outset of Section 10 may be thought to exempt 'abuse of dis-
cretion' and 'arbitrary' action from review. But such a reading must be rejected
because it produces unreasonable consequences and raises grave constitutional ques-
tions." Ibid. (Emphasis added.) It is novel doctrine that rejection of a "literal"
reading on such grounds does "violence" to the plain words, still more when other
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It is indeed strange that Professor Davis makes such charges, because
his own interpretation reads ninety-seven or ninety-eight percent of
the "except" clause "out of the Act." To avoid the difficulties that
flow from his "literal" reading, he gives effect to the exception only
in the few situations where, prior to adoption of the APA, statutes
had allegedly been construed to render "abuse of discretion" un-
reviewable3 Finally, if common sense may intrude, the vast bulk of
the cases involves a sound exercise of discretion which, on any reading
of the "except" clause, continues to be insulated, so that as a practical
matter the "reading out of the Act" charge is poppycock.
II. PROFESSOR DAVIS' OWN PRIVATE STOCK
Professor Davis, as we have seen, does not really espouse a "lit-
eral" reading of section 10, but perceiving that such a reading is
impracticable, suggests "a solution," a "practical interpretation which
will carry out the probable intent" of Congress."8 His interpretation
turns on a singular reading of the words "by law committed to agency
discretion." Chairman McCarran, a chief architect of the APA, ex-
plained shortly after its enactment that these words mean "of course,
that claimed discretion must have been intentionally given to the
agency by Congress, rather than assumed by it." And, he continued,
"abuse of discretion is expressly made reviewable [by section
10(e)]." ' Early in the legislative process there was concern whether
the "committed" phrase made clear that only abuse of discretion, not
discretion, was reviewable,40 thereby exhibiting an understanding that
the "committed" phrase did not cut down review of "abuse of dis-
cretion" in whole or in part.
Without taking account of these and other materials, Professor
Davis spins a recondite reading that has no support in the legislative
history and is contradicted by the statutory terms. "To the extent,"
he says, "that 'the law' cuts off review for abuse of discretion, the action
is committed to agency discretion." If "abuse of discretion" was
unreviewable by virtue of antecedent statutes, it remained unreviewable
"plain words," the § 10(e) instruction that courts should set aside "abuse of dis-
cretion" and "arbitrary" action, also must be given effect.
Davis himself recognizes that a "literal" reading of the "except" clause "makes
neither grammatical sense nor practical sense." Id. at 21. Moreover, my analysis
of the statutory terms in truly literal terms, giving effect to the meaning Congress
had in mind, Berger 60-61 (summarized pp. 788-89 supra, 791-92 infra), shows that
the "realization" he would attribute to me was farthest from my mind.
a See pp. 790-91, 810-11 infra.
38 See text accompanying note 29 supra.
39 McCarran, Improving "Administrative Justice": Hearings and Evidence; Scope
of Judicial Review, 32 A.B.AJ. 827, 831 (1946).
40 S. Doc. No. 248, at 36.
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under the phrase "by law committed to agency discretion." Congress
allegedly intended by the latter phrase to impose a duty on the courts
to inquire whether a particular statute was designed to insulate "abuse
of discretion" from review, and if they so find, "the pre-[APA] . . .
law on this point continues." 41
No case was called to Congress' attention which preserved "abuse
of discretion" or "arbitrary action" from review. No one, of course,
argued that such hypothetical cases required continued insulation from
review or that existing statutes had been interpreted to insulate arbi-
trariness and that such statutory insulation was to be preserved.4"
Professor Davis tacitly confesses that there is not a word in the legis-
lative history to indicate that Congress had any such meaning in mind,
for he advances his reading as a "practical interpretation which will
carry out the probable intent." ' His surmise as to the "probable
intent" of Congress-for which he furnishes not a shred of evidence-
is then transmogrified by him into a "clear expression of Congress in
favor of preventing review." " To mention only one roadblock to his
surmise, Chairman Walter stated that "discretion" conferred no
"authority in any case to act blindly or arbitrarily." 'r If, according
to Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, "the ambiguous word 'final'" cannot under
the "generous review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act"
be construed "as cutting off the right of judicial review in whole or
in part," 4 how can the express direction to set aside arbitrary action
be limited by resort to the even more ambiguous word "committed"?
A closer look at the statutory terms will fortify the implicit answer.
A. An "Abuse of Discretion" Is Not Comprised in "Discretion"
When courts talk of discretion, they exclude from its confines
"abuse of discretion";" r the two are antithetical. So it is difficult to
read "by law committed to agency discretion" as if it included au-
thority to "abuse" discretion. To show the "unsoundness on its face"
of this analysis, Professor Davis says, "['Obviously'] unreviewable
discretion is [not] the same as authority to abuse discretion" "--a
barren play on words. Since we are testing Davis' "practical inter-
41 DAVIS, Supp. § 28.16, at 21. See also p. 810 infra.
42 1n striking contrast, the Attorney General, commenting on the first exception,
called attention to cases which had interpreted statutes to preclude review. S. Doc.
No. 248, at 229-30; see notes 155, 159 infra.
4DAVIs, Supp. § 28.16, at 21. (Emphasis added.)
4 4 Id. at 25.
45 S. Do. No. 248, at 368; Berger 62.
48 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955).
4 7 Berger 61 n.33.
48 DAvIs, Sum. § 28.16, at 21.
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pretation," we are entitled to notice that in practical effect unreview-
able discretion permits administrators to abuse it. When arbitrariness
is permitted, it is empty rhetoric to maintain that it is not "author-
ized." " But such discussion leads us on false trails, for the point is
that Congress and the courts employ "discretion" as the antithesis of
"abuse of discretion" so that an exception for "discretion" cannot ex-
empt its "abuse." That antithesis is expressed on the face of section
10 as will now appear.
B. An Abuse of Discretion Is "'Not in Accordance With Law"
Section 10 excepts action "by law committed to agency discretion."
Section 10(e) refers to action found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." "That
conjunction," my article stated, "shows that Congress regarded an
'abuse of discretion' as 'not in accordance with law,' and in consequence
did not embody it within the exception for 'action . . . by law com-
mitted to agency discretion.' " " Congress is not irrational; it did
not intend by the phrase "by law committed" to comprehend what is
"not in accordance with law." These interlocking phrases play havoc
with Davis' theory that the exception of "discretion" selectively ex-
empted some "abuse[s] of discretion." He attempts no explanation
but describes the obvious sum of these statutory phrases as mere
assertion-Berger "asserts." 5
C. The Legislative History Bars Unreviewable Abuse of Discretion
The Davis reading is at war with Chairman Walter's statement
that agencies "do not have authority in any case to act blindly or arbi-
trarily," 52 and other telling items of legislative history.5" But all this
is dismissed with the remark that in the Treatise "both sides of the
legislative history are fully examined. One can quickly see from the
49 This is the tenor also of the Senate and House reports: "It has never been the
policy of Congress to prevent the administration of its own statutes from being judi-
cially confined to the scope of the authority granted or to the objectives [e.g., "dis-
cretion" as opposed to "abuse of discretion"] specified. Its policy could not be other-
wise, for in such a case statutes would in effect be blank checks . . . ." S. Doc.
No. 248, at 212, 275; Berger 62-63. In other words, the reports equate the absence of
review with a "blank check," i.e., unlimited authority. And compare Chairman
Walter's remarks in dispelling the "confusion . . . respecting the discretion of
agencies," that they "do not have authority in any case to act blindly or arbitrarily,"
again assimilating review of arbitrariness to limitation of authority. S. Doc. No. 248,
at 368; Berger 62.
o Id. at 61. (Emphasis added.)
5 1 DAvis, SuPP. § 28.16, at 16.
52S. Doc. No. 248, at 368 (Emphasis added.); Berger 62.
53 Id. at 62-64; see text accompanying note 158 infra.
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discussion how Mr. Berger can choose materials on one side and sup-
port his argument." "' This is a none too adroit innuendo that I
deliberately gave a one sided version of the legislative history which,
according to Professor Davis, "is mixed and confusing, although the
strongest part of it supports a literal reading." "' The fact is that
I took pains to examine all portions of the history that bore on the
"except" clause and on section 10(e). Further, I commented fully
on Professor Davis' various attempts to discount the effect of ex-
pressions adverse to his view as well as to probe what he considers
"the strongest part" of the history. 6 Would that he had done as much
for my arguments.
In raking Dean Pound over the coals, Professor Davis revealed
an exquisitely refined conscience, to instance only two examples: "The
quotation is accurate, but taking it out of its context and putting it into
Pound's context is as clearly misleading as if the words themselves
were false." 17 Again, he fulminated against a partial quotation be-
cause "without indicating the omission" Pound "however innocently,
misled his readers." 58 And there is more of the same kidney. These
alleged lapses are not nearly so grave as Davis' false innuendo that I
deliberately presented a one sided picture without disclosing that "the
strongest part" of the legislative history went the other way.
Professor Davis' method of dealing with the legislative history,
I suggest, muddies the waters. Certain portions of the legislative
history, for example that dealing with section 10 (a)-who is entitled to
judicial review-are indeed "mixed and confusing," as is set forth in
detail in my article.59 But in contrast, the history of the discretion
exception seems quite clear,6" and here it is Professor Davis who con-
fuses analysis by drawing on general discussions of reviewability, 61
which at best must yield to unequivocal statements about the particular
question whether "abuse of discretion" was to be reviewable.
, DAvis, Supp. § 28.16, at 18. (Emphasis added.)
55Ibid. Professor Davis makes a puzzling statement in the course of discussing
the first exception: "But the weakness is that the legislative history of the APA is
not merely on one side but on both sides, and the strongest part of it-the abandon-
ment of a proposal to eliminate reviewability-is on the other side [i.e., against review-
ability]." Id. at 24. The "abandonment of a proposal to eliminate reviewability"
seems to evidence an intention to provide for reviewability. On what theory is this
"on the other side" of reviewability?
56 Berger 62-69.
5 7 Davis, Pound I 97.
58 Id. at 94-95.
59 Berger 84-88.
60 Id. at 62-64.
O8 Id. at 65-69.
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III. "THE LAW AS IT IS" "2 -- OR "Is" IT?
What "is" the law? Certainly the law "is" not that the "except"
clause is given the "literal" effect that Davis now claims for it and
now rejects. What he apparently means is that because his artificial
(and untenable) reading of "by law committed" has been invoked by
a few courts, that that reading has now become "the law"; that is
what the law "is." The best evidence of what the law "is" is the
terms of APA section 10, the legislative history of the "discretion" and
"abuse of discretion" provisions, and the constitutional considerations
that must guide interpretation. Instead of meeting the issues presented
by this material and abundantly discussed in my article, Professor
Davis would drown me in "cases." He rashly asserts that "scores of
cases hold that action which is by law committed to agency discretion
is unreviewable, contrary to Mr. Berger's main thesis," 13 but, it should
be added, before they had a chance to examine that thesis. The "case
law," says Professor Davis, "is uniformly against" Berger; the "courts
are unanimously giving the 'except' clause a literal interpretation," 14
62 DAVIS, Sutp. § 28.16, at 17.
63 Id. at 23. (Emphasis added.) I venture to doubt whether Professor Davis
can muster even a dozen cases which have espoused his view that "action which is
by law committed to agency discretion is unreviewable." In his Comment he cites
only two, and unless I am mistaken there are very few more. And he utterly fails
to take into account the many cases which, as in Cobb v. United States, 240 F. Supp.
574, 581 (W.D. Ark. 1965), say that "if the action of the governmental agency was
arbitrary or capricious, then an action may be asserted under section 10 of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act," without so much as a glance at the alleged limitations
imposed by the "except" for "discretion" clause. See Berger 60. And if "delegated
power, of course, may not be exercised arbitrarily," FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279,
292 (1965), how can it be insulated from review?
64 DAvis, Sun,,. § 28.16, at 25. Again and again Professor Davis asserts that
"not a single case supports Mr. Berger's position," id. at 16, 17, 23, and that I "cite
none," id. at 17, 25. This inaccuracy is particularly inexcusable because these very
assertions were contained in the draft manuscript which Professor Davis sent for my
comment prior to publication, accompanied, inter alia, by the question whether I could
furnish "any case in agreement with . . . [my] thesis. You [Berger] don't cite any."
I replied that if he would reread my article carefully he would "find the answer to
[his] questions."
The answer is to be found in Berger 78 n.126, which quotes extensively from
First Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 232 F. Supp. 725 (E.D.N.C. 1964), rev'd on
other grounds sub noin. First Nat'l Bank v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267, 270 (4th Cir. 1965),
and states that portions of this opinion "serve as a convenient summary of my own
analysis." The court rejected the view that arbitrary action by the comptroller on
a national bank's application to establish a branch is not reviewable. That case belies
the Davis assertions that I do not cite a "single case."
A view contrary to First Natl Bank had been taken in Community Nat'l Bank v.
Gidney, 192 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Mich. 1961), in reliance on the Davis Treatise. My
article pointed out gently that the recantation of the district court after publication
of its opinion had not been "generally noticed." Berger 75. Gidney had been cited
at § 28.06 of the 1963 Davis Supplement as relying on the Treatise. In the 1965
Supplement it has disappeared without so much as a reference to the recantation for
the benefit of those who had relied on the 1963 Supplement. More surprising is
Davis' failure to call attention either at § 28.06 or § 28.16, which treat of review of
"discretion," to First Nat'l Bank, supra, the recent case which rejected unreview-
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and to make matters worse, "the passage of the Treatise on which the
Ninth Circuit relied is one which Mr. Berger specifically rejects." '
If I am not properly overawed by "the cases"-even the few
which cite "The Treatise"-I only follow an example sanctified by
Professor Davis himself. Addressing himself to a point of evidence re-
specting which he considers that Professor McNaughton produces
"cloudy confusion," Professor Davis has said: "The ultimate principle
is not what the American Law Institute has said it is . . .. Nor is it
what the Supreme Court has said it is . . . . The ultimate principle
is . . ." 66 what Professor Davis says it is. So should an ipse dixit
peal forth. But the appeal to principle, I boldly maintain, is no less
open to Berger than to Davis, even more the appeal to the statute, the
legislative history and the Constitution.67 He has called for "compre-
hensive re-examination" of Supreme Court law.6" Shall the inferior
ability of arbitrariness in the banking field on constitutional grounds. The case
does appear in the table of cases in the 1965 Supplement and is cited at §§ 24.04,
7.01, and 7.16 so that the omission does not seem inadvertent but smacks of suppression
of views adverse to his own.
The holding in Gidney, after recantation, that the action taken by the comptroller
was "not arbitrary, and capricious," Berger 75-76 n.109, assumes that the issue is
reviewable, so that Gidney II may be taken as a second case in support of my view.
These cases are not greatly outnumbered by the cases which cite Davis. As this
article went to the printer, Cappadora v. Celebrezze, No. 29647, 2d Cir., Jan. 28, 1966,
was handed down by the Second Circuit in an opinion by Judge Henry J. Friendly
which may be thought to take a middle ground. Judge Friendly poses the question
"whether the [Social Security] Act 'so far' commits decision to reopen agency dis-
cretion that a refusal would not be open to review even in case of abuse. S.o. at
845. And he concludes,
we do not believe that Congress would have wished to close the doors of
the courts to a plaintiff whose claim for social security benefits was denied
. . .because of a truly arbitrary administrative decision . . . . Absent any
evidence to the contrary, Congress may rather be presumed to have intended
that the courts should fulfill their traditional role of defining and maintaining
the proper bounds of administrative discretion and safeguarding the rights of
the individual.
Id. at 846. With this quotation I am in fullest accord, and consider that it is but-
tressed by the legislative history of APA § 10 and by constitutional protection
against administrative arbitrariness. The question remains, however, whether the § 10
exception for action "by law committed to agency discretion" was designed to bottom
the inquiry Judge Friendly made.
64 DAVIS, Sup'. § 28.16, at 20.
66 Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, in
PEasPEcWzs OF LAw 69, 94 (Pound, Griswold & Sutherland ed. 1964). (Emphasis
added.) One might perhaps learn to ape the majestic inevitability of these cadences if
one could only summon the awesome certitude they exhibit. But lesser mortals are
haunted by last lingering doubts.
67 DAvis, TREATISE § 23.10, at 344. The fact, noticed by Professor Davis, that
courts had spoken of a certain judicial opinion as "excellent," called it "a keen
analysis of the problems" and a "most complete exploration of the authorities in
this field" only wrings from him the exclamation "How strange that the federal
courts should not only follow but should even acclaim such an unfortunate opinion."
Ibid. By the same token, if Professor Davis is mistaken in his analysis, as I believe my
article demonstrates, the occasional judicial citation of his view is no less "strange."
8Id. at 117. In his Comment, he states that a "number of confused courts have
recently invoked the law of unreviewability" on another problem. DAVIs, Supp. § 28.16,
at 29. Courts have been no less "confused" in invoking the Davis "committed" inter-
pretation.
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courts now enjoy greater immunity because a few have "relied" on
"The Treatise" ?
IV. THE DAvis CITATIONS
Let us now consider whether Professor Davis' analysis of "the
cases" exhibits the "painstaking scholarship" which, he lectured Dean
Pound, the American Bar expects of an "illustrious scholar."
A. The Schilling Case
In Schilling v. Rogers,O a German, resident in Germany during
World War II and consequently an "enemy" by definition, sought to
reclaim property seized by the Government, relying principally on APA
section 10. The Court split five to four and the majority held that
the first exception for statutory preclusion of review applied because
the Trading with the Enemy Act made the relief provided therein the
"sole . . . remedy" and Schilling could not as an "enemy" fit within
its terms."7 The Court also stated that "the permissive terms in
which the section 32 return provisions are drawn persuasively in-
dicate that their administration was committed entirely to the dis-
cretionary judgment of the Executive branch 'without the intervention
of the courts.' " 7 Section 32 provided that the administrator "may
return any property" and for present purposes let it be assumed that
an honest determination not to return was therefore not reviewable.
Schilling, however had urged that:
judicial review is in any event available because the complaint,
whose allegations as the case comes here must be taken as
true, alleges that the administrative action was arbitrary and
capricious. However, such conclusory allegations may not
be read in isolation from the complaint's factual allegations
and the considerations set forth in the administrative decision
upon which denial of this claim was based. . . So read,
it appears that the complaint should properly be taken as
charging no more than that the administrative action was
erroneous.7
2
Thus the Court read the charge of "arbitrariness" right out of the
case; it construed the complaint to "charge no more" than "erro-
neous," not arbitrary, action. Nevertheless, Professor Davis states
that "the effect of the holding was to refuse to determine whether the
69 363 U.S. 666 (1960).
7o Id. at 670, 671.
71 Id. at 674.
72Id. at 676. (Emphasis added.)
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agency's action was arbitrary." 7 The Court did not "refuse" to make
that determination; rather it found that on the pleadings there was no
occasion to make it. Did not the "painstaking scholarship" he de-
manded of Dean Pound also require Professor Davis to notice that in
any event Schilling was limited factually to an enemy resident in enemy
territory who, under the cases, is not protected by due process? 7'
Therefore, as was pointed out in my article, the case sheds no light
upon whether an American resident who is protected by due process
can be denied judicial review of official arbitrariness.
Having held that the Trading with the Enemy Act precluded
review because it provided the "sole remedy," and therefore the case
fell within the first section 10 APA exception-"where statutes pre-
clude review"-the Court might easily have held with Professor Davis
that such statutes provide for "unreviewability even for arbitrari-
ness." " That would have been the short way of disposing of the
issue. Instead, the Court took pains to determine that the pleadings
did not really charge arbitrariness, that they charged "no more than
that the administrative action was erroneous." Does not this attempt
to postpone decision suggest that the Court has yet to decide whether
statutes precluding review shut off review of arbitrary action? 7'
B. The Arrow Case
Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry.,7 7 it will appear, falls within
the first exception of section 10, where "statutes preclude judicial re-
73 DAvis, Sup,. § 28.16, at 19. (Emphasis added.)
7 4 Berger 71 n.79.
75 DAvis, Sup'. § 28.16, at 17.
76 The frequent statements by the Court to the effect that the Constitution leaves
no room for the exercise of arbitrary power, notes 15-16 supra, might well give the
Court pause if a citizen protested that he could not constitutionally be deprived of
review of arbitrary action. Although Professor Davis had earlier cited cases saying
that a withdrawal of federal jurisdiction may cut off all review, even of the issue
whether a decision is wholly unsupported by evidence, 4 DAVIs, Ta TisE 78; cf. id.
at 95, he left himself an escape hatch in the Comment: "Congress has power within
reasonable limits to determine that "administrative action shall be reviewable or un-
reviewable." DAvis, Strp. § 28.16, at 25. A statute which cuts off all review of
constitutional claims has yet finally to be tested. At least one court has stated that
the congressional power to withdraw federal jurisdiction is limited by the due process
clause. Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948); cf.
Hart, The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. RE-v. 1362 (1953).
There are probably no more than half a dozen statutes, which like the veterans'
benefits provision, discussed at p. 798 infra, expressly deprive the courts of juris-
diction to review. Most of them deal with "gratuities or benefits," a distinction
upon which Professor Davis sets great store. DAvis, Supp. § 28.16, at 17. I concur
with Professor Reich that the use by the government of "benefits" as an instrument
of government has become so widespread as to call for a reevaluation of traditional
attitudes towards "gratuities." Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
Apart from such reevaluation, there are already cases holding that the government
cannot discriminate in granting privileges, and by the same token it cannot be arbi-
trary. See Berger 88 n.177, 77 n.118; text accompanying note 105 infra.
77372 U.S. 658 (1963).
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view." Professor Davis himself remarked of another case that it "does
not deal with the 'discretion' exception but with the other exception-
'except as far as . . . statutes preclude review.' "18 He followed the
distinction in the Treatise; "7 it has been drawn in the cases; " and it
should be respected if only because Congress, by resorting to two ex-
ceptions, indicated its intention to deal with two different situations.
In Arrow, the Court held that Congress in the Interstate Com-
merce Act meant "to withdraw from the judiciary any pre-existing
power to grant injunctive relief." 5' The dissenters, noting the ma-
jority disclaimer of "unambiguous evidence of a design to extinguish
whatever judicial power may have existed," found no support in the
statute or its history for "the removal of judicial power to act," saying
that "whenever Congress wanted to oust the jurisdiction of the courts
it not only knew how to do it but did it in no uncertain terms." 2 A
clear example of such withdrawal of jurisdiction is furnished by
Professor Davis; the statute governing veterans' benefits provides that
"no other official or any court of the United States shall have power
or jurisdiction to review any such [administrative] decisions." "
What this amounts to is a pro tanto withdrawal of the general juris-
diction conferred on district courts by the Judicial Code. The "dis-
cretion" exception, to the contrary, premises judicial jurisdiction to
examine whether the administrative exercise of "discretion" was rea-
sonable, or supported by evidence, and section 10(e) expressly in-
structs the courts to set aside action that is "arbitrary" or an "abuse
of discretion."
Not a word in the Arrow case indicates that the Court addressed
itself to the applicability of the "discretion" exception. Notwithstand-
ing, Professor Davis, without explanation, asserts that "all nine Justices
assumed that . . . if that Act commits the action to agency discretion,
then it is unreviewable." 8" An explanation is in order because the
Court had no occasion to make any such assumption; its analysis was
couched in terms of the first exception, and the statutory withdrawal
75DAvis, Supp. § 28.16, at 24.
794 DAVIS, TREATISE § 28.08, at 33, 38.80 Hamel v. Nelson, 226 F. Supp. 96, 97 (N.D. Cal. 1963) ; Air Line Dispatchers
Ass'n v. National Mediation Bd., 189 F.2d 685, 689 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 849 (1951).
81372 U.S. at 667 (Emphasis added.); see DAVIS, Supp. § 28.16, at 20.
82372 U.S. at 664, 677, 679. (Emphasis added.)
88 DAVIS, Surp. § 28.16, at 17-18; 72 Stat. 1115 (1958), 38 U.S.C. § 211(b) (1964).
(Emphasis added.)84 DAvis, Supp. § 28.16, at 20. (Emphasis added.) On Professor Davis' reading,
the Court overrules its long standing doctrine in the ICC cases, excepting cases from
finality "(5) if the Commission acted so arbitrarily and unjustly as to fix rates con-
trary to evidence, or without evidence to support it; or (6) if the authority therein
involved has been exercised in such an unreasonable manner . . . . " ICC v. Union
Pac. Ry., 222 U.S. 541, 547-48 (1912). (Emphasis added.)
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of "power or jurisdiction" to review was decisive by virtue of that
exception for statutory preclusion. Accordingly the Arrow case fur-
nishes dubious, if any, support for the Davis Thesis.'
C. Ferry v. Udall
Ferry v. Udall 6 relies on the Davis "committed" formula, and
he labels it "a well-considered and especially instructive case." " It
is truly "instructive" for it illustrates the magnitude of the problems
which the Davis "committed" formula dumps in the lap of the courts
and which in Ferry led the court, despite its valiant efforts, into a
labyrinth.
Under the statute the Secretary of the Interior was authorized
to determine whether "in his judgment" 88 it would be proper to sell
public lands at public sale. The regulation provided that: "[U]ntil
the issuance of a cash certificate, the authorized officer may at any
time determine that the lands should not be sold . . . any bidder
has no contractual or other rights . ... " 89 Before issuance of the
cash certificate the Secretary vacated the sale on the finding that the
"true value of the land at the time the bids were received was several
times higher than the bid price." o Thereupon Ferry brought suit.
It is not clear whether Ferry was decided on the theory that the action
was in mandamus, and that mandamus does not lie to control dis-
cretion, or whether it treated the action as an ordinary suit under
section 10. 1
The federal courts have long said that mandamus does not lie to
control discretion except when discretion has been abused,9 2 nor "in
the absence of anything to show that [the rulings] were capricious or
arbitrary." And it has been squarely held that where an Indian's
name was "arbitrarily removed" from a roll, "relief in the nature of
85 "It is timely again to remind counsel that words of our opinions are to be read
in the light of facts of the case under discussion . . . . General expressions transposed
to other facts are often misleading." Armour & Co. v. Wanlock, 323 U.S. 126, 132-33
(1944).
86 336 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 904 (1965).
8 7 DAvis, Supp. § 28.16, at 20.
88 See text accompanying notes 142-44 infra.
89 336 F.2d at 709.
9 0 Ibid.
91 At the outset the court states that review was sought under the APA, id. at
708; but then it seems to say that review is being sought by writ of mandamus, id.
at 712. If the court relies solely on the rule that mandamus will not lie to control
the exercise of discretion, its lengthy analysis of the application of APA § 10 seems
gratuitous.
9 2
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 323 (1879); see Ex parte Tokio Marine &
Fire Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 113, 115 (5th Cir. 1963); Sleeth v. Dairy Prods. Co., 228 F.2d
165, 168 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 966 (1956); Goldberg v. Hoffman,
226 F.2d 681, 682 (7th Cir. 1955).
93 Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 183 (1925). (Emphasis
added.)
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mandamus is proper." " The great weight of state authority employs
mandamus to review abuse of discretion or arbitrary action. 5 Conse-
quently, if Ferry was intended to rule that because mandamus does not
lie to control the exercise of discretion, it can therefore not be used to
review abuse of discretion, the court was mistaken.
On the other hand, if the court sought to extend to an ordinary
action under section 10 for review of arbitrary action the rule govern-
ing mandamus for control of "discretion," it was importing limitations
into an ordinary action which do not even obtain in mandamus. Sup-
pose arguendo that mandamus cannot be invoked to review arbitrary
action, Professor Davis should be the first to inveigh against im-
portation of "the harmful and needlessly complex" limitations of
mandamus into the liberalizing terms of section 10."
Viewed as an ordinary action, Ferry raises some perplexing prob-
lems. Certainly this was not a case of applying the "plain" or "literal"
terms of section 10, for the court said that: "Almost every agency
action involves some degree of discretion of judgment. Yet it cannot
be said that, for this reason, every action is unreviewable." 17 Rather,
the court started with the Treatise without inquiring whether Davis'
"practical interpretation" of "by law committed" was tenable, and
then proceeded to grapple with the problems to which application of
the Davis formula gives rise. "The analytical problem," it said, "is
that of determining when the agency action is 'committed to agency
discretion' . . . and when it 'involves discretion which is nevertheless
reviewable.' "98 Then it decided that "the Secretary's decision is
'committed' to his discretion" because that was "consistent with
Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc." " The nub of Panama, the
94 United States v. Ickes, 117 F.2d 769-72 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313
U.S. 575 (1941).
95 The cases are collected in 55 C.J.S. § 63, at 103 n.68 (1948).
96"The law of mandamus is both positively harmful and needlessly complex";
it is "burdened with intricacies having no relation to modern practical needs." 3 DAviS,
TREATISE § 23.12, at 361, § 23.10, at 343. See also id. § 23.10, at 336-48.
97 336 F.2d at 711.
98 Quoted in DAvis, Sup'. § 28.16, at 20.
99 336 F.2d at 711. Because of the court's reliance upon Panama, and because
Professor Davis maintains that Panama read the "except" clause "literally, interpreting
it according to the face value of its words," DAvis, Sups. § 28.16, at 18, some account
of Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309 (1958), is essential. Users
of the Panama Canal sought to compel the administrator to prescribe new tolls.
From the statute the Court concluded that the administrator was "'authorized' to
prescribe tolls and to change them." "[A]t heart," said the Court, the conflict was
over a question of "statutory construction and cost accounting . . . on which experts
may disagree." Id. at 317. Without more, it seems plain that there was no problem
of abuse of discretion: "Merely to decide a question of law incorrectly is certainly not
an abuse of discretion." Ex parte Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 113, 115
(5th Cir. 1963).
The Court stated 1) that where the "duty to act turns on matters of doubtful or
highly debatable inference from large or loose statutory terms, the very construction
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court thought, 00 was its reliance upon United States ex rel. McLennan
v. Wilbur,'0 ' where the Supreme Court drew "the distinction between a
positive mandate to the Secretary and permission to take certain action
in his discretion." '0' Ferry made this distinction the test whether
arbitrary action was reviewable under section 10.
In McLennan, an applicant sought a lease under a statute which
"authorized" the Secretary "to grant to any applicant . . . a prospect-
ing permit"; it was refused and applicant sought mandamus. Con-
trasting the "authorized" section, inter alia, with another section where-
under a claimant who had "complied" with certain requirements "shall
be entitled . . . to a prospecting permit," the Court distinguished,
for purposes of testing the right to a writ of mandamus, between a
positive mandate to the Secretary and permission to take certain action
in his discretion.'3 And it concluded that since issuance of a permit
under the latter section was discretionary, mandamus would not lie
to control the exercise of discretion. But McLennan had no occasion
to decide and did not decide that abuse of discretion could not be
reached by mandamus, let alone by some other remedy.
If Ferry was not decided as an action in mandamus, then the
court converted the McLennan test whether "discretion" (not its
abuse) is reviewable by mandamus into a test of whether arbitrariness
is reviewable in an ordinary action. Proceeding from the differentia-
tion between "mandatory" and "permissive" discretion Ferry concluded
that if the statute makes the conferring of rights "mandatory" "it
would be anomalous to allow a locator to lose rights" because ad-
ministrative personnel "made erroneous or arbitrary decisions concern-
ing compliance with the law." 'o But why should "permission" to
grant a license be translated into license arbitrarily to deny it? Why
of the statute is a distinct and profound exercise of discretion," 356 U.S. at 318;
and 2) that arguably "Congress to date has sided with" the Panama Canal Company,
in the light of which the Court concluded that "the question is so wide open and at
large as to be left at this stage to agency discretion." Id. at 319. (Emphasis added.)
Thus the main thrust of the opinion is that relief in the nature of mandamus is un-
available "to compel petitioner to fix new tolls," id. at 318, where the matter is not
"at this stage" sufficiently "clear for the courts to intrude." Id. at 319.
True it is that the Court stated that APA § 10 "excludes from the categories of
cases subject to judicial review 'agency action' that is 'by law committed to agency
discretion.' We think that the initiation of a proceeding for readjustment of the tolls
of the Panama Canal is a matter that Congress has left to the discretion of the
Panama Canal Co." Id. at 317. But under the facts of the case this means merely
that the decision was for the agency where reasonable men could differ, and then
only "at this stage." Against this background, Professor Davis' praise of the case
for a "literal" reading of the "except" clause sheds absolutely no light on reviewability
of abuse of discretion, for the question of arbitrariness is not in the case.
100 336 F.2d at 712.
101283 U.S. 414 (1931).
'02Id. at 418.
103 Id. at 416-18.
104 336 F.2d at 713.
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should administrators be allowed arbitrarily to deprive citizens of
potential rights or privileges merely because the statute "permits" them
to grant rights? Several courts have held that even in the area of
dispensing privileges, administrators cannot be arbitrary,' 5 merely a
reflection of the Supreme Court's statement that "there is no place
in our constitutional system for the exercise of arbitrary power." 106
Then too, speculation as to congressional intent to preclude review
was not designed by Congress to be the arch on which unreviewability
would rest; and the Ferry conclusion that "permissive" statutes were
intended to be unreviewable, even if the crabbed complexities of man-
damus as a tool for controlling the exercise of "discretion" are put to
one side, rests on the veriest speculation. 1 7  Chairman Walter, explain-
ing the first exception to section 10, said: "Legislative intent to forbid
judicial review must be, if not specific and in terms, at least clear,
convincing, and unmistakable under this bill." " Having required
such clear and unmistakable intent to shut off review under the first
exception which is quite narrow in application, did Congress by the
second exception mean to give the courts carte blanche to decide from
the vaguest evidence that Congress intended to shut off review in the
vast "discretion" domain? ".. A negative answer also seems to be
indicated by another congressional statement: Congress, fully aware
that unreviewability served to give a "blank check" to administrators,
declared in both the House and Senate reports that "it has never been
the policy of Congress to prevent the administration of its own statutes
from being judicially confined to the scope of the authority granted
[arbitrariness is never authorized] or to the objectives specified
[i.e., "discretion" reasonably exercised as opposed to "abuse of dis-
cretion"], n  Blank checks that result in unreviewability are therefore
contrary to congressional policy, as they are to judicial requirements:
"Action challenged as a denial of due process-whether substantive in
the sense of being arbitrary or by capricious classification . . . could
105 Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ; Hornsby v. Allen, 326
F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964); Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell, 290 F.2d
368 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
106 Garfield v. United States ex rel. Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249, 262 (1908).
107 Compare Davis' remarks about a parallel line of cases in which reliance is
placed "on a vague legislative intent that is never pinned down." DAvis, Su'P.
§ 28.67, at 27."
108 S. Doc. No. 248, at 368.
109 As will appear, the Davis "committed" interpretation would read into the
second exception a species of statutory preclusion of review of arbitrariness which
preclusion is the generic subject of the first exception, so that the legislative history
of the first exception is the more plainly applicable to the Davis reading. See text
accompanying notes 159-61 infra.
110 S. Doc. No. 248, at 212, 275.
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be immune from judicial review, if ever, only by the plainest mani-
festation of congressional intent to that effect." "'
Probably these and other problems were not mooted in Ferry,
but Professor Davis found them discussed in my article, and it is no
answer to my position to add another case that uncritically cites "The
Treatise." Notwithstanding that Ferry has the imprimatur of Pro-
fessor Davis, it would be premature to conclude that Ferry has said
the last word as to "what the law is" on this score, and as will appear,
he himself deviates from the Ferry rule in recommending a different
decision in the Cadillac case.
D. Other Davis Citations
There is no need to tax the patience of the reader by examining
the remaining Davis citations in equal detail, for summary treatment
will suffice. First, there are the cases involving discretion to prosecute,
a matter to which I spoke in my article." 2 Here it need only be noted
that Professor Davis overlooks the fact that even in this area of broad
discretion, the question whether an arbitrary refusal to prosecute is
reviewable was carefully reserved in one of the very cases cited by him
and probably reserved in one of the others." 8 Next there are the
Cadillac and Pullman cases which do not rely on Professor Davis but
conclude that the discretion exception cuts off review of abuse of dis-
cretion on the ground that "we have no right to disregard this plain lan-
guage." 114 But what then becomes of the equally "plain" section 10(e)
direction to set aside abuse of discretion? The "literal language" of the
second exception read against section 10(e), Professor Davis said,
"makes neither grammatical sense nor practical sense, for the exception
consumes the whole power of the reviewing court . .. " 115 So the
analysis of Cadillac which does not invoke the Davis "committed"
doctrine is at odds with Davis' own view. Then there is Freeman v.
Hygeia Dairy Co., which merely involves the exercise of discretion
as distinguished from abuse of discretion."' Finally Hamel v.
"11 Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Emphasis added.);
cf. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 190 (1958).
112 Berger 67-69.
113 "We need not here canvass whether . . .a court can correct an abuse of
discretion by the general counsel in failing to issue a complaint," having found that
there was in fact no abuse of discretion. Retail Store Employees Union v. Rothman,
298 F.2d 330, 332 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1962). A somewhat less clear reservation was
expressed in Moses v. Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762, 765-66 (D.D.C. 1963). Both cases
are cited in DAvIs, Supp. § 28.16, at 23.
114 United States v. One 1961 Cadillac, 337 F.2d 730, 733 (6th Cir. 1964); see
Pullman Trust & Say. Bank v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
Both cases are cited in DAvIs, Supp. § 28.16, at 22.
3"
5 Id. at 21 ; see text accompanying note 29 supra.
116 326 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1964); DAVIS, Supp. § 28.16, at 22-23. The statute
authorized the Secretary to "conduct a referendum of producers . . . ." He "con-
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Nelson,117 like Ferry v. Udall, relies on the Davis "committed" inter-
pretation, also taking it on faith. This odd m6lange of cases falls far
short of making out that the law "is" what Professor Davis says it "is,"
i.e., that "by law committed" was designed to perpetuate unreview-
ability of arbitrariness in selected areas.
V. "THE LAW AS IT OUGHT To BE"
Professor Davis rigidly separates in watertight compartments
"the law as it is" from "the law as it ought to be." 118 In light of his
search for a "practical interpretation which will carry out the probable
intent" of Congress, one might consider the APA "ambiguous" and
consequently conclude that "what the law ought to be" should be a
most persuasive determinant of what the law "is," i.e., what the statute
means. But no, segregation is his motto. And to teach Berger a
proper respect for the separation between "what the law is" and "what
the law ought to be," the same Professor Davis who, in this Comment
alone, condemns one "ill-considered" dictum of the Supreme Court as
"atrocious" 11 and another Supreme Court concept as "pernicious"; '0
who leaves several Supreme Court opinions drawn and quartered,
in still quivering fragments; 121 who rejects a principle formulated by
ducted a referendum on the question whether to include two new counties in a milk
marketing area," ibid. It was contended that the latter were entitled to a separate
referendum. The court said that "it must necessarily follow from the complexities
of administration . . . that the details of a referendum, and the manner in which it
is conducted, must be left exclusively in the hands of the Secretary." 326 F.2d at 273.
The controversy revolved around the construction of the statute and the Secretary's
construction of "producers" was respected. Id. at 274. Arbitrariness was not argued.
117 226 F. Supp. 96, 98 (N.D. Cal. 1963); DAvis, Supp. § 28.16, at 23. Hamel
makes no reference to arbitrariness.
118 Id. at 17, 25.
119 Id. at 24.
12
0Id. at 27.
121 These are deserving of notice. As an "ill considered" dictum, Professor
Davis instances the "call for 'a judicial attitude of hospitality towards the claim that
§ 10 greatly expanded the availability of judicial review.' Heikkila v. Barber, 245
U.S. 229, 232-33. . . ." Id. at 24. Since his "personal opinion . . . is that the
presumption of reviewability should be a stronger one . . ." id. at 26, one would
expect that he would eagerly embrace the Supreme Court's admonition that courts
should be hospitable towards the "greatly expanded . . . availability of judicial
review," for this puts wheels under what must otherwise remain a pious exhortation
-given Davis' dim view of availability of review. Notwithstanding, Heikkila is
consigned to the deepest pit: "[T]he Heikkila case cuts off review where review
should be allowed; no other Supreme Court opinion is criticized so severely by the
Treatise [1] which demonstrates in §28.10 that the opinion 'revolved around four
clear-cut misunderstandings."' Id. at 24. Be it so, and yet the "hospitable" dictum
can still have a virtue of its own, certainly as applied to arbitrariness, which Congress
plainly intended should be reviewable.
That dictum was reiterated in Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955),
Berger 70 n.77, so it too is blasted, but on the ground of a different, "atrocious"
dictum. The Court, says Davis, had said that "section 10 of the Administrative
Procedure Act provides that 'Any person who suffers legal wrong because of any
agency action or is adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning
of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof."' He comments,
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the Supreme Court and asserts that "the principle is" what he says
it is; "2 now strikes an unwontedly diffident pose and offers his "per-
sonal opinion" of what the "law ought to be"! 13
The "personal opinion" of Professor Davis is that "the presump-
tion of reviewability should be a stronger one than the courts have
made it." " The law is not quite as toothless as this might suggest.
As the four dissenters in Schilling stated:
This Court has gone far towards establishing the proposition
that preclusion of judicial review of administrative action
adjudicating private rights is not lightly to be inferred ....
Generalizations are dangerous, but with some safety one can
say that judicial review of such administrative action is the
rule, and nonreviewability an exception which must be
demonstrated. 25
Not alone has this statement the sanction of respectable authority,
126
but that truly "painstaking scholar," Professor Jaffe, found that
"[J]udicial review is the rule. It rests on the congressional grant of
general jurisdiction to the article III courts. It is a basic right; it is a
traditional power and the intention to exclude it must be made specif-
ically manifest." 127 And such learning was caught up in the legislative
"of course, the APA provides nothing of the kind. The Court simply forgot about
the 'except' clauses. The Court's remark is therefore of no significance, because it
rests upon an obvious oversight." Ibid. One who delivers himself of such scathing
criticism should be factually invulnerable. The "obvious oversight" is Davis' own.
Discussing Heikkila, the Court said that it held that "the Administrative Procedure
Act gave no additional remedy since § 10 excepted statutes that precluded judicial
review"; that exception was relevant because the Court "had construed the word
'final' in the 1917 Act as precluding any review except by habeas corpus . "
Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, supra, at 50. Thus the Court did not "forget" about the
"except" clauses but rather discussed one of them.
Must the Court discuss every "except" in the APA at the risk of being charged
with "oversights"? There are, for example, also the exceptions carved out from
the act by § 2(a). By the time a case reaches the Court, particularly when the govern-
ment is a party, the Court is entitled to assume that no exception is relevant or it
would be among the questions assigned.
122 See text accompanying note 66 supra.
= 3 DAvis, Supp. § 28.16, at 26.
24 Ibid.
12 5 Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 677 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
(Footnote omitted.)
2 6 In Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 190 (1958), the Court said that where
"'absence of jurisdiction of the federal courts' would mean 'a sacrifice or obliteration
of a right . . ."' conferred by Congress, it "cannot lightly infer that Congress does
not intend judicial protection of rights it confers against agency action taken in excess
of delegated powers." This is but the "presumption of reviewability" garbed in
different rhetoric. And where the right to be protected from arbitrariness derives
from the Constitution, the "presumption of reviewability" is even stronger. See
Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964); text accompanying note 111
supra. In American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 110
(1902), the Court said that the courts must have the "power . . . to grant relief"
to protect against "uncontrolled and arbitrary action . . . ." Cf. Berger 90.
= 7 Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review, 71 HARV. L. R!v. 401, 432 (1958). This
was also the view of Judge Friendly in Cappadora v. Celebrezze (2d Cir. January 28,
1966), quoted in part, sura note 64.
1966]
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history of the first section 10 "exception" in Chairman Walter's state-
ment that "legislative intent to forbid judicial review must be . . .
dear, convincing, and unmistakable." "2' So the "presumption of re-
viewability" is a living reality, the more so when constitutional rights
are at stake. The unqualified direction in section 10(e) to set arbitrary
action aside, coupled with Chairman Walter's statement that adminis-
trators do not have authority to act arbitrarily "in any case," goes far
to strengthen that presumption.
In addition, Professor Davis adduces three "fundamentals" which
strongly militate against his analysis. These "fundamentals" are:
(1) A limited judicial review [review whether action is
arbitrary is limited] does not weaken the administrative
process but strengthens it. . . . (2) Completely cutting off
what the courts have to offer a governmental program may
violate the cardinal principle that the functions should be
allocated between courts and agencies on the basis of com-
parative qualifications of each tribunal. The judges are
specialists in constitutional issues . . . [and] in the limits of
fair procedure [and I would add in abuse of discretion and
arbitrary action] . . . . A review which is limited to bring-
ing into play these special judicial talents can be helpful in
all respects to accomplishment of administrative objectives
and harmful in no respects. '(3) A third fundamental is the
principle of check. When the interests affected are of suffi-
cient magnitude, any initial exercise of power should be
subject to check by an independent authority . ... "
In his Comment, Professor Davis concludes that "these three funda-
mentals ought to be the guide to reviewability of any subject matter
that is intrinsically suitable for judicial review." "' Each of these
"fundamentals" exerts a powerful pull toward reviewability of arbi-
trariness, and each should make a court reluctant to conclude that a
statute interposes an insuperable obstacle to review. And I would add
a fourth "fundamental" of even greater magnitude: there is constitu-
tional protection against administrative oppression and arbitrariness-
128 S. Doc. No. 248, at 368.
129 4 DAvis, TREATISE § 28.21, at 112-13.
130 DAVIs, Supp. § 28.16, at 28. He observes that these "fundamentals" would
"[enlarge] . . . the area of reviewability," and yet I "ignored" them. Id. at 16.
(Emphasis added.) This is yet another index of his indifference to accuracy. In
his letter to me of February 23, 1965, he asked, "Why did you ignore my § 28.21" ?-
i.e., his three "fundamentals." My reply of March 2 stated that "you yourself lay
down principles in § 28.21 (which I did not "ignore" but inadvertently missed, much
to my regret) which are at war with an easy assumption that arbitrariness should
be insulated." But Professor Davis adheres to "ignore," doubtless to suggest that
I had willfully neglected to mention something which I was under a duty to take into
account, when, in fact, I would have eagerly cited his "fundamentals" for they fortify
my analysis.
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"delegated power may not be exercised arbitrarily." 11 This "funda-
mental" was magnificently epitomized by Mr. Justice Wilson, after
participating in the Convention and in the Pennsylvania Ratification
Convention:
Every wanton, or causeless, or unnecessary act of authority,
exerted or authorized, or encouraged by the legislature over
the citizens, is wrong, and unjustifiable, and tyrannical: for
every citizen is of right, entitled to liberty, personal as well as
mental, in the highest possible degree, which can consist with
the safety and welfare of the state.
3 2
Against this background let us now examine "why should not
the law be what. . . . [the utopian Berger] wants it to be? The
principal answer," Professor Davis tells us, "is that Congress .
has power within reasonable limits . . . to cut off review," and by
the second exception of section 10 gave "clear expression . . . in
favor of preventing review." 13 That "clear" expression proved on
close examination merely to be Professor Davis' surmise as to Con-
gress' "probable intent," 134 so that the "principal answer" is no answer
at all. "Another reason," he states, is that "much administrative dis-
cretion is intrinsically unsuited to judicial review," instancing the
President's or State Department's conduct of foreign affairs.135  Six
pages of my article were devoted to this and other practical reasons
adduced by Professor Davis against judicial review, 1 6 but of this he
131 See text accompanying note 15 supra.
132 2 WILsoN's WORKS 393 (Andrews ed. 1896).
133 DAvis, Supp. § 28.16, at 25.
134 See text accompanying notes 43, 45 supra.
13 5 DAvis, Supp. § 28.16, at 25. In his Treatise, Professor Davis proffered an
arbitrary denial of military leave as an example of action which "from a practical
standpoint cannot be subject to judicial review . . . ." 4 DAvis, TREATISE § 28.16,
at 81-82. To test this proposition change the example to denial of all leave to one
individual for a protracted period because he is a Negro. In my article, I set out
materials which indicate that one who enters military services is not beyond the
judicial pale. Berger 79-80. Since then, Gellhorn, The Swedish Justitieombudsman,
75 YALE L.J. 1, 38 (1965), points out that Sweden created a separate military ombuds-
man "to guard citizens against abuses in military administration," citing among other
prosecutions those of "a commissioned officer who had insulted a noncommissioned
officer, a commander who had punished draftees for being drunk . . ." when off duty
on nonmilitary premises, illustrating at least that one modern nation finds it entirely
"practical" to have civilian supervision of such matters. And I would add that one
who is asked to surrender several years of his life, perhaps life itself, should not be
penalized by deprivation of judicial protection. We cannot ask men to bleed for
human dignity who are themselves deprived of it.
13 6 Berger 74-80. Referring to the statement in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 324 (1936), that Congress left many matters "affecting
foreign relations" to the President's "unrestricted judgment," the Court recently stated
that "this does not mean that simply because a statute deals with foreign relations,
it can grant the Executive totally unrestricted freedom of choice." Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965). Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962), earlier pointed out
in an analysis of "political questions" that no blanket insulation from judicial review
obtained in foreign relations. Berger 79. If the President does not have "unrestricted
rights," he is subject to judicial inquiry no less than any other officer of the United
States. Id. at 90. See also Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry,
12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1044, 1103-07 (1965).
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takes no account. Given a "presumption of reviewability" that rises to
constitutional proportions, given the section 10(e) mandate to set
"arbitrary action" aside, each such claim for exemption on practical
grounds should at least be carefully scrutinized by a court rather than
be accepted on a priori assertion. Professor Davis assumes that bare
restatement of his position suffices to still criticism, and he stubbornly
avoids the uncomfortable issues.1' 7 But assertion ex cathedra cannot
take the place of reasoned refutation, even when it comes from Pro-
fessor Davis.
At last we come to the example Professor Davis magistrally em-
ploys to illustrate "a point of view [his "personal opinion"] that might
well be the law but is not the law," 138 United States v. One 1961
Cadillac.!9 Cadillac, like Ferry, involved a permissive, not a manda-
tory, statute; the administrator was not ordered to act. The statute,
Professor Davis states, provides "that the Secretary 'if he finds' speci-
fied facts 'may remit or mitigate . . .' " and it dealt with remission
of forfeitures, resting heavily on the "act of grace" concept. 4  Here
we have a full blown "permissive" statute, which, under the Ferry
interpretation of the Davis "committed" formula, would not permit
review of arbitrariness. Inasmuch as Professor Davis describes Ferry
as a "well considered" case, one might expect that he would apply the
"permissive" analysis to Cadillac. But his sympathies have been en-
gaged, and he is not hog-tied by logic.
His analysis is a display of virtuosity which deserves study for
its own sake. Of the statutory terms "if he finds" and "may remit," he
tells us, "one can hardly deny that the words pull in the direction of
unreviewability. Indeed, a bit of logic the Supreme Court used as
early as 1825 has persuasive force; interpreting a remission statute
it said: 'It would be a singular issue to present to a jury for trial,
whether the facts . . . were sufficient or not to satisfy the secretary
of the treasury . . . ' "' " Unhappily the law has moved on since
1825. Today the formula "if he finds" certain facts is differentiated
from formulae such as "if he is satisfied" or "if in his judgment" the
facts warrant." "If he finds" formulae are generally reviewable to
ascertain whether there is substantial evidence that the facts so found
137 Professor Bailey, who rose to the defense of Dean Pound in 1942 and was
then a colleague of Professor Davis at the University of Texas, commented on Davis'
"own agility in avoiding contact with unpleasant facts." Bailey, Dean Pound and
Administrative Law-Another View, 42 COLUM. L. RIy. 781, 802 (1942).
138 DAVIs, Supp. § 28.16, at 26.
129 337 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1964).
140 DAvis, Supp. § 28.16, at 26-27.
4 Id. at 26 (Emphasis added.); see United States v. Morris, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 246, 285 (1825).
14 2 Cf. Minichello v. Saxon, 337 F.2d 75, 83 (3d Cir. 1964).
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exist'4  One may call them "objective." "In his judgment" or "if
he is satisfied" are subjective; it is not easy to enter into the mind of
the Secretary and to determine whether he is indeed "satisfied." Such
formulae are exceptional, but even they do not shut off review. Pro-
fessor Davis himself, referring to an "in his judgment" case, stated that
"such words would not prevent the Court from reviewing if it felt
strongly that its intervention was necessary to . . . correct a serious
abuse of discretion . . . . An outstanding example of judicial dis-
regard for such words of discretion is United States v. Laughlin." 144
So the logical "pull" toward unreviewability of an "if he finds" formula
is quite attenuated, as Professor Davis must know.
But I must not be unfair to him; having set up one logical "pull"
he judiciously counterbalances it with another, "an opposing bit of
logic that the grant of power to the secretary is conditioned upon his
acting reasonably and without abuse of discretion. The question re-
mains as to what is desirable in absence of a showing of historical
intent of Congress to cut off review. . . . But apparently no such
showing has ever been made." 14 It is not merely logic but the Con-
stitution which is the source of the proposition that "delegated power
. . . may not be exercised arbitrarily." 146 So the first pull of "logic"
toward unreviewability is outweighed by a constitutional protection.
And if "no showing has ever been made" of congressional "intent to
cut off review," a judicial conclusion that action is unreviewable rests
on shaky underpinning. The APA history requires a "clear .
unmistakable" legislative intent to shut off review.147 Reviewability is
the rule, and "the intention to exclude it must be made specifically
manifest." 148 Given constitutional claims, review can be shut off, "if
ever, only by the plainest manifestation of congressional intent to that
effect." 149
Professor Davis takes a different tack; in the area of "re-
mission or mitigation," he says, the courts, as in Cadillac, stamp re-
143A statutory provision "if the Secretary . . . finds" requires him to make a
finding, Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 43 (1924), and that finding serves, among other
things, to facilitate review. Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554, 559
(D.C. Cir. 1938); Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194, 215 (1931); Schaffer
Transp. Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 83 (1957). Professor Davis states that
"findings help protect against careless or arbitrary action." 4 DAvis, TREATISE § 16.05,
at 446.
144 4 DAVIs, TRATISE § 28.16, at 85; Berger 71. Compare American School of
Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 100, 106 (1902), where the Court
construed the formula "upon evidence satisfactory to him" to require a showing of
"actual fraud."
1 4 5 DAvis, Supp. § 28.16, at 26.
146 See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
147 See text accompanying note 128 supra.
148 See text accompanying note 127 supra.
149 See text accompanying note 111 supra.
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mission as an "act of grace," often a "pernicious" concept, and he
asks, "is it good government or good law to tell the finance company
[which has made a loan on the forfeited car] that it is entitled to
neither a hearing nor a limited judicial review"? ' What, one asks,
has been gained by shifting from a strong ground-the express terms
of section 10(e), its legislative history, and constitutional injunctions
against arbitrariness-to the vague ground of "good government and
good law"? The "good" turns on considerations of justice and ad-
ministration which equally fortify the argument for immediate applica-
tion of section 10(e), thereby dispensing with Professor Davis' com-
plicated minuet.
More important, his analysis, as I shall now show, deprives the
courts of power to reconsider whether prior statutory interpretations
are "good law." He has painted himself into a corner. Professor Davis
reads the "committed" phrase to postpone consideration whether arbi-
trariness is reviewable to examination of what the primary statute, for
example, the statute which sets up the agency, provides on this score."'
In the context of the second "except" clause, he states, " 'committed to
agency discretion' and 'unreviewable' have . . . the same meaning.
.. To the extent that 'the law' cuts off review for abuse of dis-
cretion . . . the pre-Act law on this point continues.' " 152 Allegedly,
the "discretion" exception of section 10 represents a "clear expression
of Congress in favor of preventing review." 153 Now the "pre-Act
law" was either an explicit statutory bar to review or a judicial inter-
pretation having the same effect, i.e., "a common law of unreview-
ability" '" which may be assimilated to "inexplicit preclusion" under
the first exception. If Congress had in mind to "continue" the "pre-
Act law," to "prevent review," how can a court reconsider the avail-
ability of review under the primary statute? Inexplicit statutory pre-
clusion is then no more alterable than the explicit statutory bar.155
130 DAvis, Supp. § 28.16, at 27.
151 Davis states that "the court was clearly right in holding that the Administra-
tive Procedure Act prevents review for abuse of discretion if the forfeiture statute
commits the action to agency discretion, and although the court was clearly right in
finding that the cases it relied upon interpret the forfeiture statute to cut off review,"
his "quarrel is with the whole batch of cases that so interpret the forfeiture statute."
Id. at 26. In a word, whether arbitrariness should be reviewable must be reconsidered
in the framework of the "forfeiture" statute, not in that of the APA. Under his
reading, courts "examined" the particular statute under which an agency operates to
discover whether or not the action is committed to agency discretion . . . . " Id. at 25.
162 Id. at 21. (Emphasis added.)
153 Id. at 25. (Emphasis added.)
35 Id. at 27.
155 With respect to the first exception for statutory preclusion, it was said that
"when, as in the Switchmen's case, it had been held that Congress manifested its
intention to exclude review the new [APA] legislation was not to be construed as
changing the situation." Air Line Dispatchers Ass'n v. National Mediation Bd.,
189 F.2d 685, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1951). (Emphasis added.) A fortiori no court could
do so.
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Under the Davis reasoning, section 10 froze the "pre-Act law" and
put the prior interpretive statutory denials of review beyond the reach
of the courts.
All this is of course in the realm of fantasy. There is no legis-
lative history for support of Professor Davis' reading; it rests on his
bare surmise, a "practical interpretation which will carry out the
probable [sic] intent." 15 There is no shred of evidence that Congress
intended to create a system of selective review of arbitrariness. To
the contrary, Chairman Walter emphatically stated that under the
APA arbitrariness would be reviewable "in any case." 157 And he
said that the APA was meant
to be operative "across the board" in accordance with its
terms, or not at all. Where one agency has been able to
demonstrate that it should be exempted, all like agencies have
been exempted in general terms. . . . Where one agency
has shown that some particular operation should be exempted
from any particular requirement, the same function in all
agencies has been exempted. No agency has been favored
by special treatment.' 58
Presumably Professor Davis would argue that the "committed" phrase
constitutes just such an exemption; but I would maintain that the
Walter statement demands more than a "practical interpretation" in
search of a "probable intent" to give rise to an exemption from the
general direction to set aside arbitrary action.
In essence, Professor Davis would read into the second exception
a special type of statutory preclusion-where courts had construed
primary statutes to preclude review"' of "abuse of discretion" or
"arbitrariness." But if a "statute precludes review," explicitly or in-
implicitly, the situation is covered by the first exception. Congress well
knew how to preserve existing statutory preclusion where it so in-
156 DAvIs, Supp. § 28.16, at 21.
157 See S. Doc. No. 248, at 368.
15Id. at 250. (Emphasis added.) It scarcely needs saying that the "reenact-
ment" rule has no application. Customarily it applies when a particular statute is
reenacted under the fiction that Congress must be assumed to be familiar with inter-
pretations of the existing statute. But cf. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,
348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). The APA was no reenactment but the initial enactment
of a new code of practice, and we can not attribute to Congress by that enact-
ment an intention to freeze into the APA a wilderness of interpretations of uncounted
substantive statutes that govern the sprawling governmental functions and agencies.
Such ratification also runs counter to the legislative history.
159 I am aware of the Attorney General's statement that the first exception em-
braced inexplicit preclusion, i.e., where a statute has been "interpreted as manifesting
a congressional intention to preclude judicial review . . . [e.g.] Switchmen's Union
of North America v. N.L.R.B., [308 U.S. 401] . . . ." S. Doc. No. 248, at 229-30.
To begin with, it is significant that the Attorney General limited his example of in-
explicit preclusion to the first exception; he did not refer to similar cases of statutory
preclusion under the second exception.
Even as to the first exception, there is good reason not to receive the Attorney
General's views as "legislative history" but rather as the "view of an interested member
812 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
tended and did so by the first exception. If a particular "abuse of
discretion" was shielded from review by an antecedent statute, the first
exception preserved the shield and there is no need to read into the
second exception a shelter for a special brand of statutory preclusion.
The fact that Congress felt it necessary to make express provision in
the first exception for existing cases of statutory preclusion indicates
a view that but for that express provision all antecedent statutory pre-
clusion of review would have been repealed. 6 Consequently, a claim
for statutory preclusion in special statutes allegedly shutting off review
of "abuse of discretion" either comes within the first exception or it
fails, for in such case the first exception is the "special" provision that
governs. And if statutory preclusion is in fact involved, the House
report states that "to preclude judicial review under this bill a statute,
if not specific in withholding such review, must upon its face give
clear and convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it." 101 Professor
Davis' surmise as to the "probable intent" of Congress to provide for
selective unreviewability of certain cases of "abuse of discretion" is
not an adequate substitute for the required showing.
CONCLUSION
Professor Davis states that "every one would like to have arbi-
trariness and abuse corrected"; 162 he would make the "presumption of
reviewability . . . a stronger one"; 16 and also has formulated three
"fundamentals" which favor "enlarging the area of reviewability." 164
Why then search for a "probable intent" of Congress to shield arbi-
trariness from review in the guise of a "practical interpretation"? What
of the Executive Department whose activities were sought to be regulated and whose
opposition the Congress overrode." Berger 65-67. And the entire concept of "in-
explicit" preclusion needs to be reexamined in light of the House report statement
that inexplicit preclusion requires that the statute "must upon its face give clear and
convincing evidence of intent to withhold review." S. Doc. No. 248, at 275. See Air
Line Dispatchers Ass'n v. National Mediation Bd., 189 F.2d 685, 689 (D.C. Cir.
1951). Where is that "clear and convincing evidence of intent" to withhold review
in the "except" for discretion "by law committed," especially when read against the
categorical and unqualified direction in § 10(e) to set aside arbitrary action and abuse
of discretion.
160 The House report states that "any inconsistent agency action or statute is
in effect repealed." S. Doc. No. 248, at 281.
161 Id. at 275 (House report). (Emphasis added.) In Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 37, 41 (1950), Mr. Justice Jackson adverted to the fact that
administrative decision had been "accorded considerable finality" and that there had
been a growing conviction that administrative power was "sometimes put to arbitrary
and biased use," and said that "it would be a disservice to our form of government
and to the administrative process itself if the courts should fail, so far as the terms
of the Act warrant, to give effect to its remedial purposes where the evils it was aimed
at appear."
1 6 2 DAvis, Su''. § 28.16, at 17.
1
6 3 Id. at 26.
L64Id. at 16.
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is "practical" about an interpretation which proceeds from an a priori
assumption that "much administrative discretion is intrinsically un-
suited to judicial review" of arbitrariness, 165 thus sheltering conduct
that all abhor. Constitutional protection against arbitrariness is not
to be withheld on hypothetical grounds. And given Davis' three
"fundamentals" and "presumption of reviewability," is it not necessary
to inquire why they must yield to an assumption of "intrinsic un-
suitability"? In no comer of American life can it be assumed that
protection against official oppression is "intrinsically unsuitable."
His interpretation of the "discretion" exception, I submit, cannot
survive a careful analysis of the statutory terms and of the unequivocal
legislative history which bears directly on the issue. In view of the
fact that an extensive explanation of this view was put before him in
my article, one can only conclude that he "ignore[s] the full facts thus
presented" and refuses to "face squarely all the available facts." "", And
I would add a failure for which he mercilessly harried Dean Pound, a
failure of accuracy. His Comment is shot through with inaccuracy;
and to borrow what he said about Dean Pound:
I do not suggest any reason for . . . [his] numerous mis-
takes. But it is fair to observe that his errors always run in
one direction; they always aid his strictures about [Berger's
analysis] .... 117
Yet another disturbing aspect of the Davis Comment is its ex-
aggerated defensiveness. It is as if having once uttered his views they
become infallible dogma from which there can be no retreat. Defensive-
ness is doubly dangerous in one upon whom the courts rely, for it not
only prevents him from correcting his own mistakes but may clog the
path of judicial self-correction. Of Bacon's three great mottoes for
scholars-"patience to doubt, slowness to assert, readiness to recon-
sider"-the last is not the least.
36 Id. at 25.
166 Davis, Pound I 102.
167 Id. at 101 n.18.
